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We study the role of the information deposited in the environment of an open quantum system
in course of the decoherence process. Redundant spreading of information — the fact that some
observables of the system can be independently “read-off” from many distinct fragments of the
environment — is investigated as the key to effective objectivity, the essential ingredient of “classical
reality”. This focus on the environment as a communication channel through which observers learn
about physical systems underscores importance of quantum Darwinism — selective proliferation of
information about “the fittest states” chosen by the dynamics of decoherence at the expense of their
superpositions — as redundancy imposes the existence of preferred observables. We demonstrate
that the only observables that can leave multiple imprints in the environment are the familiar pointer
observables singled out by environment-induced superselection (einselection) for their predictability.
Many independent observers monitoring the environment will therefore agree on properties of the
system as they can only learn about preferred observables. In this operational sense, the selective
spreading of information leads to appearance of an objective “classical reality” from within quantum
substrate.
PACS numbers: 03.65.Yz, 03.65.Ta, 03.67.-a
I. INTRODUCTION
Emergence of a classical reality within the quantum
Universe has been the focus of discussions on the in-
terpretation of quantum theory ever since its inception.
Measurement — the process through which we learn
about the world — has the power to transform fuzzy
quantum states into solid classical facts. Understanding
measurements has been therefore rightly regarded as the
key to unlocking the mystery of the quantum-classical
transition since the early days [1]. Bohr’s interpretation
proposed in 1928 [2] introduced the classical domain “by
hand”, with a demand that much of the Universe — in-
cluding measuring devices — must be classical. This
Copenhagen interpretation proved to be workable and
durable, but is ultimately unsatisfying, because of the
arbitrary split between “the quantum” and “the classi-
cal”. Thus, Copenhagen interpretation notwithstanding,
attempts to explain the emergence of the classical, ob-
jective reality (including measurement outcomes) using
only quantum theory were made ever since its structure
became clear in the late 1920’s.
Von Neumann [3] introduced a particularly influential
model of the measurement process. In his approach —
and in contrast to Bohr’s view — the apparatus A is
also quantum. “Bit-by-bit measurement” [4] is the sim-
plest example: a 2-dimensional system S in pure state
∗Present address: School of Physical Sciences, The University of
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α|0〉+ β|1〉 interacts with a 2-dimensional apparatus ini-
tially in state |µA0 〉. In course of the controlled-not (or
“measurement”) gate the apparatus becomes — as one
would now say — entangled with the system S:
(α|0〉+ β|1〉)⊗ |µA0 〉 → α|0〉 ⊗ |µA0 〉+ β|1〉 ⊗ |µA1 〉. (1)
This is pre-measurement. It implies correlation of S and
A, but does not yield a definite outcome.
The structure of Eq. (1) suggests a relative state in-
terpretation of quantum theory [5]. However, to make
contact with the familiar reality, one must point out the
“preferred relative states”. Yet, in the bipartite setting of
the pre-measurement, such proposals are difficult to make
without some ad hoc assumptions (e.g, about the special
role of either “memory states” [5] or of the “Schmidt ba-
sis” [6]).
Presence of entanglement in the state obtained after
the pre-measurement implies a basis ambiguity — cor-
relation of observables of A with incompatible sets of
pure states of the system which cannot be resolved with-
out some modification of the model [4]. For example,
the states {|µA0 〉, |µA1 〉} of A are in one-to-one correspon-
dence with the states {|0〉, |1〉} of S, while the states{
(|µA0 〉 ± |µA1 〉)/
√
2
}
are in one-to-one correspondence
with the states
{
(α|0〉 ± β|1〉)/√2} of S. Thus, von Neu-
mann’s model does not account for the existence of a
fixed “menu” of possible measurement outcomes — an
issue that must be addressed before the apparent selec-
tion of one position on this menu (i.e. the “collapse of
the wave-packet”) is contemplated.
Decoherence theory (see e.g. [7, 8, 9, 10, 11] for re-
views) added a new element that goes well beyond the
2von Neumann’s measurement model: in addition to S
and A, decoherence recognizes the role of the environ-
ment E that surrounds A and interacts with the appara-
tus (or with any other object immersed in E). The result-
ing “openness” of A invalidates the egalitarian principle
of superposition: while all states in the Hilbert space
of the apparatus A are “legal” quantum superpositions,
only some of them will retain their identity — will be
stable in spite of the coupling to E .
Returning to our example, the environment may in-
teract with A in such a way that an arbitrary super-
position ξ0|µA0 〉 + ξ1|µA1 〉 is transformed into a mixture
|ξ0|2|µA0 〉〈µA0 | + |ξ1|2|µA1 〉〈µA1 | after a very short time.
Thus, only the two states |µA0 〉 and |µA1 〉 remain pure
over time. Selection of such preferred set of states is
known as environment-induced superselection, or einse-
lection. The persistence of the correlation between A and
S is the desired prerequisite of measurements, and only
stable pointer basis of A selected by the interaction with
E fits the bill [4, 9, 10, 11, 12]. Indeed, after the decoher-
ence time, the joint state of S and A, Eq. (1), becomes
mixed:
|α|2|0〉〈0| ⊗ |µA0 〉〈µA0 |+ |β|2|1〉〈1| ⊗ |µA1 〉〈µA1 |. (2)
As a consequence of decoherence, only classical correla-
tions of A with the system states {|0〉, |1〉} persist.
Understanding the reason for the loss of validity of the
quantum principle of superposition is a significant step
in the understanding of the quantum-classical transition,
but it does not go all the way in justifying objectivity: the
einselected pointer states are still ultimately quantum.
Thus, they remain sensitive to direct measurements — a
purely quantum problem. An observer trying to find out
about the system directly will generally disturb its state,
unless he happens to make a non-demolition measure-
ment [13, 14] in the pointer basis. As a consequence, it is
effectively impossible for an initially ignorant observer —
someone who does not know what are the pointer states
of the system — to find out the state of a physical sys-
tem through a direct measurement without perturbing
it: immediately after a direct measurement the state will
be what the observer finds out it is, but not — in general
— what it was before.
The situation becomes even more worrisome when one
considers many initially ignorant observers attempting
to find out about the system. As a consequence of the
disturbance caused by a direct measurement on the sys-
tem, the information gained by the first observer’s mea-
surement can get invalidated by the second observer’s
measurement, etc., unless they all happen to measure
commuting observables — or more precisely, unless the
measured observables share the system’s pointer states
as eigenstates.
Quantum subjectivity is to be contrasted with the ob-
jectivity of classical physics, where many ignorant ob-
servers can — at least in principle — find out the state
of the system without modifying it. This is because clas-
sical systems admit an underlying objective description
(“classical reality”), and classical states can be found out
by initially ignorant observers. This is generally not the
case for quantum systems. Thus, objective information
about quantum systems can be acquired directly by many
only by a constrained set of pre-agreed measurements on
S (see e.g. [15, 16]).
Of course — as noted in past discussions of einselection
[7, 17, 18] — there are good reasons for the observers to
focus on the set of states singled out by decoherence: only
such pointer states of S (or their dynamically evolved
descendants) continue to faithfully describe the system
in spite of its interaction with E . All other states are
affected by E , making loss of predictability inevitable.
Predictability is characteristic of the states of classical
systems, and is thus a symptom of a classical reality.
But, above all, prediction is the reason for measurements.
One can therefore understand how observers with prac-
tical experience with the emergent classicality (imposed
in our Universe by einselection) will be forced to choose
the same pointer observables as they make their choice
of what to measure: save for pointer observables, there
is no other choice if measurements are to be useful for
prediction. This may look like a “pre-agreement”, but it
involves no consultation between observers: competing
with the environment is simply not an option.
In effect, the environment acts as a superobserver,
monitoring the same pointer observable over and over,
with frequency and accuracy that cannot be matched by
other (e.g., human) observers. They all have to mea-
sure observables that commute with the pointer observ-
able. Last but not least, interactions available to ob-
servers are similar in structure (e.g., depend on distance,
etc.) to the interactions responsible for the einselection
[10, 18]. So, predictive utility in presence of decoherence
and limited choice of the Hamiltonians available in our
Universe motivate “pre-agreement” by constraining mea-
surements to pointer observables. However, even if such
“pre-agreement imposed by einselection” can help single
out what observables can become objective, the actual
role of the environment in what happens in practice far
more dramatic and decisive: the environment is not just
a superobserver — it becomes a witness. Observers use it
to find out about systems of interest. Hence, they must
be content with the information that can be extracted
from its fragments (as, generally, they will never be able
to intercept all of E).
In its original formulation, decoherence theory treats
the information transferred to E as inaccessible. How-
ever, in the real world, this is typically not the case. In-
deed, as was pointed out by one of us some time ago
[17, 18, 19], the fact that we gain most of our informa-
tion by intercepting a small fraction of the photon en-
vironment is significant for the emergence of effectively
classical states from the quantum substrate. The purpose
of this paper is to investigate the consequences of such an
indirect information acquisition for the quantum-classical
transition, and to explore the relation of this “environ-
ment as a witness” [10] point of view to the predictability
3of the pointer states as well as to other issues raised and
partially explored in [20]. We shall demonstrate that the
manner in which the information is stored in the envi-
ronment is the reason for the inevitable consensus among
many observers about the state of the effectively classical
(but ultimately quantum) systems. In other words, the
structure of information deposition in E is responsible for
the emergence of the objective classical reality from the
quantum substrate.
We shall also begin to explore quantum Darwinism:
the dynamics responsible for the proliferation of corre-
lations that leads to the survival of the fittest informa-
tion. This is a natural complement to the environment
as a witness approach that is focused on how the data
about S can be extracted by interrogating E . Quan-
tum Darwinism allows the environment to act as a wit-
ness [10, 20, 21], adding a new dimension to the modern
decoherence-based view of the emergence of the classical.
In the next section, we propose an operational notion
of objectivity and discuss how we will use it to inves-
tigate the quantum-classical transition. Sections III and
IV set up the notation and introduce tools of information
theory required for the present study. Section V contains
the core information-theoretic analysis of the manuscript.
There, we establish a number of facts about the struc-
ture of the information stored in the environment, and
study consequences of redundant imprinting of selected
system observables in E . These general properties are
then illustrated in Section VI on a dynamical model used
extensively in the study of decoherence. This allows us
to extend the results of our analysis, and establish a di-
rect connection between einselection and the emergence
of an objective classical reality. Finally, we consider some
open questions in Section VII and conclude in Section
VIII with a summary.
II. OPERATIONAL DEFINITION OF
OBJECTIVITY
Quantum Darwinism [10, 20] aims to show that a con-
sensus about the properties of a quantum system — the
key symptom of classical reality — arises naturally and
inevitably from within quantum theory when one rec-
ognizes the role of the environment as a broadcasting
medium that acquires — in the process of monitoring the
system of interest that leads to decoherence and einselec-
tion — multiple copies of the information about preferred
properties of the system of interest.
We will set up a rigorous operational framework for the
analysis of the emergence of objective classical reality of
quantum systems, based on the following definition of
objectivity:
Definition II.1 (Objective property) A property of
a physical system is objective when it is
1. simultaneously accessible to many observers,
2. who are able to find out what it is without prior
knowledge about the system of interest, and
3. who can arrive at a consensus about it without prior
agreement.
This operational definition of what is objective is inspired
by the notion of “element of physical reality” used by
Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen in their famous “EPR”
paper [22] on entanglement: “If, without in any way dis-
turbing a system, we can predict with certainty (i.e. with
probability equal to unity) the value of a physical quan-
tity, then there exists an element of physical reality cor-
responding to this physical quantity. [...] Regarded not
as a necessary, but merely as a sufficient condition of re-
ality, this criterion is in agreement with classical as well
as quantum-mechanical ideas of reality.” Any property
of the system fulfilling this requirement would be con-
sidered an element of objective reality according to the
definition we adopt.
The environment as a witness approach recognizes that
in our everyday acquisition of data, the decision of what
to measure on S is taken out of our hands by the en-
vironment, and rests with the dynamics responsible for
decoherence — i.e. for the monitoring of the system by
E . Nevertheless, in the absence of any structure of E , this
would still be insufficient to explain the emergence of a
consensus about the state of S. Measurements on the
environment suffer from the same basis ambiguity prob-
lems as direct measurements on the system: they can
be performed in arbitrary bases. Moreover, they gen-
erally disturb the state of the environment, and hence,
the correlations between S and E . Unless all observers
had agreed to measure the environment in the same ba-
sis, their subsequent measurements on the environment
might not yield consensus about the system, and one
would not be able to attribute “objective properties” to
its state.
The solution to this puzzle becomes obvious after a
close inspection of how we learn about systems in the
real world. Not only do the independent observers gather
information about S indirectly by measuring the envi-
ronment, but different observers have access to disjoint
fragments of E . By definition, when the same informa-
tion about S can be discovered from different fragments,
it must have been imprinted in the environment redun-
dantly. In addition, when many disjoint fragments of the
environment contain information about the state of the
system, its properties can be found out by different ob-
servers without the danger of invalidating each other’s
conclusions. This is because observables acting on dis-
joint fragments of E always commute with each other.
Hence, the first two requirements for objectivity are sat-
isfied.
Moreover, and this is a crucial result of our study, we
will demonstrate that redundant imprinting in the en-
vironment selects a preferred set of system observables.
In particular, for obvious reasons [23] the environment-
promoted amplification of information required to arrive
4at a redundant imprinting cannot amount to cloning.
Amplification comes at the price of singling out com-
muting system observables. As a consequence, even ini-
tially ignorant observers performing arbitrary measure-
ments on their fragments of E will find out only about
this unique observable. Selectivity of amplification es-
tablishes that redundant imprinting in the environment
is a sufficient requirement for the emergence of classical
objective reality. Thus, the state of the system is de facto
objective when its complete and redundant imprint can
be found in E .
Quantum Darwinism makes novel use of information
theory by focusing on the communication capacity of the
environment. This approach complements the conven-
tional “system-based” treatments of decoherence. There,
the environment is above all an “information sink”, a
source of decoherence responsible for irreversible loss of
information [4, 8, 9, 24]. However, these two complemen-
tary approaches do agree in their conclusions: as we will
show, the pointer observables singled out by einselection
are the only ones that can leave a redundant imprint on
the environment. In part, this can be understood as a
consequence of the ability of the pointer states to persist
while immersed in the environment. Moreover, in both
approaches predictability of the preferred states of the
system (i.e., either from initial conditions, or from many
independent observations on E) is the key criterion. This
predictability is tied to the resilience that allows the in-
formation about the pointer observables to proliferate,
very much in the spirit of the “survival of the fittest”,
and corroborates conjectures about the role of quantum
Darwinism in the emergence of objectivity we have de-
scribed before [10, 20, 21].
III. DEFINITIONS AND CONVENTIONS
In the setting we are considering, a system S with
Hilbert space HS interacts with an environment E with
Hilbert space HE . We denote the dimension of these
state spaces by dS and dE respectively. Furthermore, we
assume that the environment is composed of N environ-
mental subsystems E1, E2, . . . EN (see Fig. 1). That is,
its Hilbert space has a natural tensor product structure
HE =⊗Nk=1HEk . This partition plays an important role
in our analysis, as it suggests a natural definition of the
independently accessible fragments of E . We will com-
ment on it at the end of Section IV.
The joint quantum state of S and E is described by
the density operator ρSE defined on HS ⊗ HE . The re-
duced state of the system is obtained by “tracing out”
the environment ρS = TrE{ρSE}. It will often be useful
to consider the joint state of the system and a fragment
of the environment. Such fragment — i.e. a subset of
E = {E1, E2, . . . , EN} — will be denoted by F . The re-
duced state of S and F is obtained by tracing out the
complement of F : ρSF = TrF{ρSE}, where F = E − F .
Following textbook quantum mechanics, we call “ob-
FIG. 1: The role and the structure of the environment in
decoherence and in quantum Darwinism. (a) Decoherence
treats environment as a monolithic entity inaccessible to ob-
servers. The only role of E is to be a “sink” of information
about S . This is enough to understand einselection — the
emergence of the preferred pointer observable in the system,
with decoherence - free pointer eigenspaces. In our Universe
(b) environments are typically not monolithic. Rather, they
consist of subsystems, e.g. atoms or photons. From the point
of view of decoherence, there is no difference between the
paradigms illustrated by (a) and (b): The same environment
will lead to the same evolution of the system (e.g., in quan-
tum Brownian motion the same environment can be modeled
either as a monolithic field or as a collection of harmonic os-
cillators). Quantum Darwinism (c) recognizes that observers
acquire their information about S without interacting with
it directly – from the imprints left by S on the fragments
of E . Such fragments are generally much smaller than E .
The central result of this paper is to show that the selected
information about the system that is inscribed redundantly
— in many copies — on the environment, and can be there-
fore found out independently from different fragments of E by
many observers, concerns the einselected pointer observable.
servable of S” (resp. of E) any Hermitian operator de-
fined on HS (resp. HE). By convention, we will use the
first letters of the alphabet A,B,C to denote system ob-
servables while the last letters X,Y,Z will be reserved
for environment observables. Hermitian operators can be
written in their spectral decomposition, e.g.:
A =
∑
j
ajAj . (3)
Adding to our convention, observables are denoted by
bold capital letters, their eigenvalues by lowercase letters,
and spectral projectors by capital letters. Only the spec-
tral projectors are of interest to us as they completely
5characterize the measurement process, and the correla-
tions between observables. We note that as we shall deal
with Hermitean observables, coherent states that are the
approximate pointer states in many situations of interest
(e.g, in underdamped harmonic oscillators) are beyond
the scope of our study.
We will use the words “system” and “environment” in
a very broad sense. Without loss of generality, we will
suppose that HS is the part of the Hilbert space of S
containing the degrees of freedom of interest. Even when
the system is macroscopic, e.g. a baseball, we are typ-
ically only interested in a few of its degrees of freedom,
e.g. center of mass, local densities, etc. Moreover, the
degrees of freedom of S that do not couple to E (directly
or indirectly) play no role in our analysis. Hence dS can
remain reasonably small even for fairly large systems: dS
is really the number of relevant distinct physical config-
urations of S. This considerably simplifies the notation
without compromising the rigor of our analysis.
Similarly, it is not necessary to incorporate “all the
rest of the Universe” in E . N really counts the number
of environmental subsystems that may have been influ-
enced by the system: only they may contain information
about S. Hence, in many situations — such as a pho-
ton environment scattering off an object — the “size” of
relevant E can grow over time.
IV. INFORMATION
The approach to classicality outlined above is based on
the existence of correlations between S and its environ-
ment that can be exploited by various observers to find
out about the system. As both S and E are quantum sys-
tems, quantum information theory may appear to be the
right tool to study these correlations. This avenue has
been considered in the past [10, 19] in parallel with the
approach we pursue here and in [20] and is currently also
under investigation [25]. However, the emphasis here is
on the observables, and information about them is easier
to characterize through the relevant hypothetical mea-
surements. As in [20], we focus on what can actually
be found out about various observables of the system by
monitoring observables in fragments of the environment.
The core question we ask is: how much does one learn
about observable A by measuring a different observable
X? This question has an operational meaning. An ob-
server may be considering measurement of the observable
A, but cannot predict its outcome with certainty. To re-
duce his ignorance, he can choose to measure a different
observable X. By doing so, he may decrease his uncer-
tainty about the value of A. The amount by which his
uncertainty decreases is precisely the information gain
we are going to study. It represents the average number
of bits required to write down, in the most efficient way,
the relevant data aboutA acquired through the measure-
ment of X.
We will mostly be interested in the case where A acts
on the system and X acts on a fragment of the environ-
ment — which automatically implies that [A,X] = 0.
However, we will occasionally need to consider the cor-
relations between the measurements carried successively
on the same system. Hence, we present here the general
case and return to the special case of commuting observ-
ables in the next section. Thus, A and X, with spectral
projectors Ai and Xj, are arbitrary physical observables
acting on an arbitrary system, in the state described by
the density matrix ρ. In the following paragraph, there
is no environment, just one system and two observables
that may or may not commute.
The observer’s uncertainty about the measurement
outcome of A is given by the corresponding Shannon
entropy:
H(A) = −
∑
i
p(Ai) ln p(Ai) (4)
where the probability associated to the measurement out-
come “i” — with the spectral projector Ai — is given by
Born’s rule p(Ai) = Tr{Aiρ}. Entropy measures igno-
rance about the value of A, the average number of bits
missing to completely determine its value. When the
measurement of observable X is performed and outcome
Xj is obtained, the state of the system is updated to
ρ
Xj−−→ ρ|Xj =
XjρXj
p(Xj)
(5)
according to the projection postulate of quantum the-
ory [3]. This state update changes the probability as-
signment of the measurement outcomes of A:
p(Ai|Xj) = Tr{Aiρ|Xj} =
Tr{AiXjρXj}
p(Xj)
. (6)
It is customary to call p(Ai|Xj) “the conditional proba-
bility of Ai given Xj” and similarly, ρ|Xj is “the condi-
tional state of the system given Xj”.
Thus, when A is measured subsequently toX, the ran-
domness of its outcome would be characterized by:
H(A|Xj) = −
∑
i
p(Ai|Xj) ln p(Ai|Xj). (7)
The conditional entropy of A given X is the average
of this quantity over the measurement outcomes of X:
H(A|X) = ∑j p(Xj)H(A|Xj). The difference between
the initial entropy of A and its entropy posterior to the
measurement of X defines the mutual information we
shall use throughout:
I(A : X) = H(A)−H(A|X). (8)
This is the average amount of information about A ob-
tained by measuring X.
In quantum mechanics, it is possible that a certain
measurement decreases one’s ability to predict the out-
come of a subsequent measurement, so mutual informa-
tion is not necessarily positive. This is in fact the rea-
son why direct measurements on the system cannot be
6H(A,X)
H(X|A)
H(A) H(X)
H(A|X) I(A : X)
FIG. 2: Venn diagram for classical information. H(A) is
the entropy associated with a measurement of A: it is the
information needed to completely determine its outcome.
H(X) is the same quantity for the observable X. H(A,X)
is the joint entropy of A and X. H(A|X) is the average
uncertainty about A remaining after a measurement of X.
The information learned about A by measuring X is thus
I(A : X) = H(A) − H(A|X). The equivalent definition
I(A : X) = H(A) + H(X) − H(A,X) can also be under-
stood from the diagram. These two definitions of the mutual
information are equivalent [26] when probabilities can be con-
sistently assigned to the outcomes of all the possible measure-
ments of A and X both separately and jointly: this is ensured
when A and X commute. They need not coincide otherwise.
used to arrive at a consensus about the state of the sys-
tem. A direct measurement by one observer will invali-
date the knowledge acquired by another when their mea-
surements do not commute. However, this disturbance
can be avoided when the measurements are carried out
on different subsystems, since the observables commute
automatically. The mutual information between such ob-
servables has extra properties that we shall now describe.
A. Correlations between system and environment
Let us now consider the case where A acts on S and
X on E , or on a fragment F of E . As [A,X] = 0, the
order in which the measurements are carried out does
not change the joint probability distribution p(Ai, Xj) =
Tr{AiXjρXj} = Tr{XjAiρAi}. It follows from Eqs. (5-
8) that the mutual information defined above can be writ-
ten in an explicitly symmetric form:
I(A : X) =
∑
ij
p(Ai, Xj) ln
p(Ai, Xj)
p(Ai)p(Xj)
(9)
= H(A) +H(X)−H(A,X). (10)
The amount of information about A that is obtained
by measuring X is equal to the amount of information
gained about X by measuring A, and is always positive.
In this special case, there is a nice diagrammatic repre-
sentation of the information theoretic quantities, shown
on Fig. 2.
Of particular interest to us is the maximum amount of
information about observable A of S that can be gained
by measuring a fragment F of the environment. This is
defined as
IˆF (A) = max
X∈MF
I(A : X) (11)
where MF is the set of measurements acting on F only,
i.e. the set of Hermitian operators that act trivially on
HF = ⊗Ek∈F HEk . The “hat” above is to emphasize
that it is the maximum amount of information.
In particular, the maximum amount of information
about the system observable A that can be retrieved
from the entire environment is denoted by IˆE(A). This
quantity plays a crucial role in our analysis as only when
IˆE(A) ≈ H(A) can we hope to “find out” about A by
probing the environment: the amount of information in
the environment, IˆE(A), must be sufficiently large to
compensate for the observer’s initial ignorance, H(A),
about the value of A.
B. Redundancy of information in the environment
When IˆE(A) ≈ H(A), the value of A can be found
out indirectly by probing the environment. However, as
noted in Section II, for many observers to arrive at a con-
sensus about the value of an observable A, there must be
many copies of this information in E . As a consequence,
independent observers will be able to perform measure-
ments on disjoint subsets of the environment, without
the risk of invalidating each other’s observations.
Redundancy is therefore defined as the number of dis-
joint subsets of the environment containing almost all —
all but a fraction δ — of the information about A present
in the entire environment. Formally, let F1,F2, . . . ,FR
be R disjoint fragments of the environment, Fi ∩Fj = ∅
for i 6= j. Then,
Rδ(A) (12)
= max
{Fj}
{
R : IˆFj (A) ≥ (1− δ)IˆE (A), ∀j = 1, . . . , R
}
where the maximization is carried over all partitions of
{E1, E2, . . . EN} into disjoint subsets. Clearly, for any
observable A, 1 ≤ Rδ(A) ≤ N . Redundancy simply
counts the number of copies of the imprint of A in E ,
and hence the maximum number of observers that can
independently find out about A from E .
C. Fragments of the environment and elementary
subsystems
Before closing this section, we wish to emphasize the
distinction we are making between fragments of E and
elementary subsystems, and comment on the role they
play in using environment as a witness. The elementary
subsystems of E are defined through the natural tensor
product structure of HE . We assume this structure to
7be given and fixed. In the case of a photon environment
for instance, an elementary subsystem could consist of a
single photon. A fragment of E on the other hand is a
collection of such elementary subsystems. For example,
while no single photon can reveal the position of an ob-
ject, a small collection of them, say 1000, may be enough
to do so.
The optimization over partitions of the environment
appearing at Eq. (12) is necessary to arrive at a proper
mathematical definition of redundancy as there is no a
priori preferred partition. This will allow us to derive
very general consequences of redundancy, at the price of
some technical (and perhaps also conceptual) complica-
tions. However, for the purposes of the emergence of
a consensus among several observers — in essence an
operational objective reality — this partition should re-
flect the distinct fragments of environment accessible to
the different observers. While our results hold for any
such partition of the environment into disjoint subsys-
tems, Nature ultimately determines what part of E is
available to each observer.
The entire environment as a witness approach — and
more precisely the very concept of redundancy — capital-
izes on the fact that the environment has a tensor product
structure HE =⊗Ek HEk . This raises the obvious ques-
tion “who decides what are the elementary subsystems of
E?” Our primary concern here is to provide a mechanism
by which quantum systems can exhibit “objective exis-
tence”, the key symptom of the classical behavior. As we
will demonstrate, this can be achieved given that the en-
vironment has a partition into subsystems, regardless of
what these subsystems are. Hence, what really matters is
that various observers monitor different fragments of the
environment. As long as this requirement (which guar-
antees that the observables they measure commute) is
fulfilled, their definition of subsystems of E need not co-
incide. Section V will present unavoidable consequences
of this fact, without paying attention to the definition of
the environmental subsystems. Thus, our most impor-
tant conclusion, — that redundancy implies selection of
preferred observables — is independent of any particular
choice of a tensor product in the environment.
However, different tensor product structure of the en-
vironment can a priori yield different redundantly im-
printed observables since redundancy itself makes refer-
ence to the tensor product structure. There is no defi-
nite answer to what defines an elementary environmental
subsystem, but some considerations point towards “local-
ity” as a judicious guideline. For instance, particles are
conventionally defined by the symmetries of the funda-
mental Hamiltonians of Nature, that are local. When we
choose the particles of the standard model as the elemen-
tary subsystems, we are naturally led to local couplings
between S and E . They will determine how the informa-
tion is inscribed in E . After all, “there is no information
without representation”. Moreover, the information ac-
quisition capacities of the observers are also ultimately
limited by the fundamental Hamiltonians of Nature. The
different observers occupy, and therefore monitor, differ-
ent spatial regions. Therefore, the monitored fragments
Fi entering in the definition of redundancy — as well as
the elementary subsystems Ek composing them — should
reflect these distinct spatial regions.
The fact that some division of the Universe into sub-
systems is needed has been pointed out before. Indeed,
the measurement problem disappears when the Universe
cannot be divided into subsystems [10, 11, 17]. There-
fore, assuming that such division exists in the discussion
of the information-theoretic aspects of the origin of the
classical does not seem to be a very costly assumption.
V. CONSEQUENCES OF REDUNDANCY
We now have all the necessary ingredients to study the
consequences of the existence of redundant information
about the system in the environment. Here, we derive
several properties of the system’s redundantly imprinted
observables, as well as properties of the environmental
observables revealing this information. While each of
these results is interesting in its own right, our ultimate
goal is to combine them and to show that the redundancy
singles out a preferred set of commuting observables, the
already familiar pointer observables. Throughout this
section, we assume the existence of a perfect and redun-
dant record of the system observables A,B,C, . . . in the
environment, i.e. IˆE (A) = H(A) and Rδ=0(A)≫ 1, and
similarly for B,C, . . . The general case of imperfect im-
prints will be addressed in the next section. Let us begin
by studying the consequences of the existence of a record
about the value of A in the environment.
Lemma V.1 IˆF (A) = H(A), iff there exists an observ-
able X′ ∈ MF for which H(A|X′) = 0 and H(X′|A) =
0. The measurement of X′ on a fragment of the environ-
ment reveals all the information of the system observable
A, and vice versa.
Proof When observable A is completely encoded in a
fragment of the environment, IˆF (A) = H(A), there ex-
ists X ∈ MF for which I(A : X) = H(A), which im-
plies H(A|X) = 0. As noted in Section IVA, the mu-
tual information between A and X is symmetric when
these observables act on distinct systems, i.e. S and
F . Therefore, measuring A directly on the system pro-
vides an amount of information I(A : X) = H(A)
about the value of X, thereby decreasing its entropy to
H(X|A) = H(X)−H(A). In general, this is not all the
information aboutX, asH(X) may be larger thanH(A):
X reveals all of the information about A but the reverse
is in general not true. However, by picking a suitable
coarse graining X′ of X, it is always possible to establish
the duality H(A|X′) = 0 and H(X′|A) = 0.
This can be seen quite simply. The equalityH(A|X) =
0 implies that given Xj , Ai is determined: each mea-
surement outcome of X points to a unique measurement
outcome of A. This defines a map f : Xj → Ai. Such
8map may not be one-to-one, so the conditional proba-
bility p(Xj |Ai) of Xj given Ai is not necessarily deter-
ministic. However, we can construct the coarse grained
projectors
X ′i =
∑
j:f(Xj)=Ai
Xj (13)
by regrouping the Xj in the pre-image of Ai. The out-
come of the associated measurements X′ are therefore in
one-to-one correspondence to the outcomes ofA, yielding
the stated duality. The converse is trivial with X = X ′.
An important corollary can be derived from
Lemma V.1 and the following observation: when
the outcome of a projective measurement on a system is
deterministic, the act of measuring does not modify the
state of the system.
Corollary V.1 Measurements of A and X′ have exactly
the same effect on the joint state of the system and the
environment:
X ′jρ
SEX ′j = AjX
′
jρ
SEX ′jAj = Ajρ
SEAj , (14)
which implies ρSE
|X˜j
= ρSE|Aj .
The contents of Lemma V.1 and Corollary V.1 for-
malize our intuitive understanding of the existence of a
perfect record of the information about A in E : it al-
lows perfect emulation of the direct measurement A by
the indirect measurement X′. This emulation is not only
perfect from the point of view of its information yield, it
also has the same physical effect on the state of SE . This
can be regarded as an illustration of the fact that “infor-
mation is physical” [27]: whenever the same information
can be retrieved by two different means, the disturbance
on the quantum state can be identical.1 Here, the mea-
surement of X can in principle yield more information
than the direct measurement A itself, e.g. A may be
a very coarse grained observable. This is why it is in
general necessary to coarse grain X in order to obtain
equivalent information, and therefore the same physical
effect.
Lemma V.2 When IˆF (A) = H(A), the observable A
commutes with the reduced density matrix of the system,
[ρS ,A] = 0.
Proof Following Lemma V.1 and Corollary V.1, there
exists X′ ∈ E for which X ′jρSEX ′j = AjρSEAj . The re-
1 In the theory of generalized measurements [28], one can in princi-
ple make a measurement that yields no information whatsoever,
yet greatly disturb the system; hence the emphasized “can” in
the above sentence.
duced state of the system can be therefore written as
ρS = TrE
{
ρSE
}
(15)
=
∑
j
TrE
{
X ′jρ
SEX ′j
}
(16)
=
∑
j
TrE
{
Ajρ
SEAj
}
=
∑
j
Ajρ
SAj , (17)
so ρS is block diagonal in the eigensubspaces of A.
The relation between decoherence and the existence of
an environmental record has been pointed out and inves-
tigated in the past [4, 12, 17, 18, 19, 29, 30, 31]. The
above lemma confirms that whenever the environment
acquires a single copy of the information about A, the
state of S decoheres with respect to the spectral projec-
tors Ai of A. This decoherence-induced diagonalization
of the reduced state has additional important implica-
tions when the information about the system is encoded
redundantly in the environment.
Corollary V.2 Let A be a system observable redun-
dantly imprinted in E, and let X′ be the coarse grained
observable of the fragment F of the environment that
contains all the information about A (as constructed in
Lemma V.1). Then the reduced state ρSF commutes with
bothA andX′: the correlations between these observables
are classical.
Proof By assumption A is redundantly imprinted in E .
Thus, its value can be inferred by independent measure-
ments, say X and Y, acting on two distinct fragments
of the environment, F and F = E − F respectively. Fol-
lowing Lemma V.1, we can construct a coarse grained
observable X′ which retains essential correlations to A
and with the property that H(X′|A) = 0 — a measure-
ment of A on S reveals all the information about X′.
As a consequence, the measurement Y on F that reveals
all the information about A must also reveals all the in-
formation about X′. Hence, Corollary V.2 follows from
Lemma V.2.
We will now characterize the class of system observ-
ables that can be redundantly imprinted in the environ-
ment. When A and B are redundantly imprinted in E
and redundancy is sufficiently high, their value can be in-
ferred from disjoint fragments of the environment. This
implies the following relation between any redundantly
imprinted observables.
Lemma V.3 Let F be a fragment of the environment
containing a copy of the information about A. When the
rest of the environment F contains a copy of the infor-
mation about B, then A and B necessarily commute on
the support of ρS .
Proof The assumptions of Lemma V.3 imply the exis-
tence of two environmental observables X and Y acting
on disjoint fragments of the environment F and F for
which H(A|X) = 0 and H(B|Y) = 0. Following the
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observables into X′ and Y′ that are in one-to-one corre-
spondence with A and B respectively. The observables
X′ and Y′ obviously commute with each other as they
act on disjoint fragments of E , and also commute with the
system observables A and B. Then, by Corollary V.1,
we have
AiBjρ
SEBjAi = AiY
′
j ρ
SEY ′jAi = Y
′
jAiρ
SEAiY
′
j
= Y ′jX
′
iρ
SEX ′iY
′
j = X
′
iY
′
j ρ
SEY ′jX
′
i
= X ′iBjρ
SEBjX
′
i = BjX
′
iρ
SEX ′iBj
= BjAiρ
SEAiBj ,
proving the lemma.
The above Lemma states that it is impossible to ac-
quire perfect information about two non-commuting ob-
servables by measuring two disjoint fragments of E si-
multaneously. This is reminiscent of Heisenberg indeter-
minacy principle. However, in spite of this similarity,
these two results differ in the precise setting in which
they hold. Heisenberg principle asserts that it is im-
possible to know simultaneously the values of two non-
commuting observables of an otherwise isolated system.
In our Lemma, the system is already correlated with its
environment, and the observer is trying to find out about
the value of two observables using these correlations. In
other words, Heisenberg indeterminacy concerns infor-
mation about the system before it interacted with E ,
while Lemma V.3 focuses on the information about S
that is present in E after their interaction.
This difference illustrates the nature of our operational
approach: we are describing the physical properties of
an open quantum system, hence we focus on informa-
tion about its present state, not on what it was prior to
the interaction with E . Decoherence happens, so we are
dealing with it.2
We can derive a similar result for the commutation of
environmental observables.
2 To fully grasp the distinction between these two settings re-
quires a somewhat technical discussion. Assume that the system
and environment are initially in the uncorrelated state ρSE (0) =
ρS(0)⊗ρE (0). They interact for a time t, yielding the joint state
ρSE(t) = USEρSE (0)USE† where USE = exp{−iHSE t}. When
a measurement X is carried on the environment and outcome j
is observed, the conditional state of the system will be
ρS|Xj
(t) =
TrE
{
Xjρ
SE(t)Xj
}
p(Xj)
.
According to the generalized theory of measurement [28], this
can be described as a positive operator valued measure (POVM)
acting on the initial state of the system, ρS(0). Formally, there
exists a set of operators Aij acting on HS such that ρS|Xj
(t) =∑
i Aijρ
S(0)A†ij . However, it does not correspond to any kind of
measurement acting on ρS(t), the state of the system after it has
interacted with E (see for example [32] Eq. (100)). Our Lemma
applies also to this type of information gathering processes that
cannot be described within the POVM formalism.
Lemma V.4 Let F be a fragment of the environment
containing information about both A and B, two com-
muting system observables. Then, there exist two ob-
servables X′ and Y′ ∈MF that commute on the support
of ρSE and reveal all the information about A and B re-
spectively.
Proof The assumptions of Lemma V.4 imply the exis-
tence of X and Y ∈ MF such that I(A : X) = H(A)
and I(B : Y) = H(B). Following the procedure of
Lemma V.1, X and Y can be coarse grained to X′ and
Y′ while retaining all the essential correlations to A and
B. Since A and B commute, the proof of Lemma V.3
can be applied here, yielding the desired result.
Given these properties of redundantly imprinted ob-
servables, we can now state a very important result,
which essentially ensures the uniqueness of redundantly
imprinted observables.
Theorem V.1 Let B and C be two system observ-
ables redundantly imprinted in the environment, and let
F1,F2, . . . ,FR be R ≥ 2 disjoint fragments of E, each
containing a copy of the information about B and C.
Then, there exists a refined system observable A satisfy-
ing:
1. IˆE (A) = H(A),
2. R0(A) ≥ R,
3. H(B|A) = 0 and H(C|A) = 0.
Proof The assumptions of the theorem imply the exis-
tence of YFn and ZFn ∈MFn for which H(B|YFn) = 0
and H(C|ZFn) = 0 for all n = 1, . . . , R. By Lemma V.3,
B and C must commute as they can be inferred from dis-
joint fragments of the environment. This fact, together
with Lemma V.4, implies that there exists commuting
coarse grained observables Y′Fn and Z′Fn ∈ MFn that
reveal all of the information about B and C respectively.
The observables B and C can be merged into a more re-
fined observable A with spectral projectors given by the
product of the spectral projectors of B and C:
Aij = BiCj . (18)
As Bi and Cj commute, the operators Aij form a com-
plete set of mutually orthogonal projectors. Similarly,
the environment observables Y′Fn and Z′Fn can be
merged into a more refined observable XFn with spec-
tral projectors XFnij = Y
′Fn
i Z
′Fn
j . A measurement of
XFn on Fn reveals all the information about A. Indeed,
following Corollary V.1,
p(Ai′j′ |XFnij ) =
Tr
{
Ai′j′X
Fn
ij ρ
SEXFnij Ai′j′
}
Tr
{
XFnij ρ
SEXFnij
}
=
Tr
{
Bi′Cj′Y
′Fn
i Z
′Fn
j ρ
SEZ ′Fnj Y
′Fn
i Cj′Bi′
}
Tr
{
Y ′Fni Z
′Fn
j ρ
SEZ ′Fnj Y
′Fn
i
}
= δii′δjj′
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which implies H(A|XFn) = 0. This automatically im-
plies IˆFn(A) = H(A) and, since the above holds for all
n = 1, . . . R, we have R0(A) ≥ R. Finally, note that
Bi =
∑
j Aij and Cj =
∑
iAij ; B and C are obtained
by coarse graining A. Therefore, a measurement of A
reveals all the information about B and C, hence com-
pleting the proof.
The meaning of this Theorem is that whenever more
than one observable can be redundantly inferred from a
fixed set of disjoint fragments of E , they necessarily cor-
respond to some coarse grained version of a maximally
refined redundantly imprinted observable A. The modus
tollens of this Theorem is also very enlightening. Given
a decomposition of E into fragments and the associated
maximally refined redundantly imprinted observable A,
the only observables B that can be completely and re-
dundantly inferred from these fragments of E are those
for which I(B : A) = H(B). The value of B must be
entirely determined by a measurement of the maximally
refined A. This is obviously a sufficient condition: if
a direct measurement of A reveals all the information
about B and A is redundantly imprinted in E , then so
is B. Theorem V.1 shows that this requirement is also
necessary.
Note that the proof relies only on a redundancy greater
than 2 and on a fixed decomposition of E into disjoint
fragments from which B and C are inferred. Relaxing
this last assumption raises the possibility that different
decompositions lead to incompatible maximally refined
redundant observables. Figure 3 represents two decom-
positions of E into fragments for which the correspond-
ing maximally refined redundantly imprinted observables
could not be compared through the above theorem. In
absence of further assumptions on the dynamics that is
responsible for the creation of correlations between S and
fragments of E , this possibility can be ruled out when re-
dundancy is high (see Theorem V.2 below). For most
practical cases—especially when the subsystems of E in-
teract with S according to commuting hamiltonians—
such complication can be avoided as the maximally re-
fined observable is often independent of the decomposi-
tion of E into fragments.
Theorem V.2 Let B and C be two system observables
both highly redundantly encoded in E, such that R0(B)×
R0(C) > N . Then, [B,C] = 0 on the support of ρ
S .
Proof By the assumptions of the Theorem, there exists
a fragment F of size at most N/R0(B) containing all
information about B. Since R0(C) > N/R0(B), there
exists a fragment F ′ disjoint from F , i.e. F ∩ F ′ = ∅,
that contains all information about C. By Lemma V.3
we have [B,C] = 0.
It is intriguing to note that — in view of the above
discussion — large redundancy implies R >
√
N . The-
orems V.1 and V.2 prove our claim of Section II. Re-
dundant spreading of information comes at the price of
singling out a preferred set of commuting observables:
FIG. 3: Suppose B and C are redundantly imprinted in the
environment, but are associated respectively to decomposi-
tions (a) and (b), represented by different arrangements of
the subsystems of E into fragments. Then, from Theorem V.1
one cannot yet conclude that there exists a maximally refined
observable A from which both B and C can be inferred. This
is because the two decompositions do not match. However,
when the redundancy of B and C satisfies R0(B)R0(C) > N ,
then Theorem V.2 proves that the maximally refined observ-
ables obtained for each decomposition of E into fragments
must commute (i.e. they are compatible).
those obtained by coarse graining maximally refined re-
dundantly observables.
So far, we have not considered any dynamical evolu-
tion of the system and environment: we have focused on
the correlations present at a fixed time without paying
attention to how they arise. We studied consequences of
regarding environment as a witness (and interrogating it
about the state of the system), but we haven’t yet en-
quired about the dynamics that allowed the environment
to acquire this information in the first place. Ultimately,
it is the coupling Hamiltonian between S and E which es-
tablishes these correlations. The coupling is also respon-
sible for the emergence of preferred system observables
— the pointer observables — that are least affected by
the openness of the system. Thus, as in the case of ein-
selection of the pointer states, the connection between
the emergence of an objective reality and the selection
of preferred observables has to be ultimately traced to
the dynamics responsible for the “environmental moni-
toring’ of S by E — i.e., through dynamical considera-
tions. When the correlations between maximally refined
observables and fragments of the environment persist in
time, Lemma V.2 and Theorems V.1 & V.2 imply the
following conclusion.
Corollary V.3 Highly redundantly imprinted observ-
ables are system’s pointer observables.
In other words, under the idealized assumption of per-
fect records we have demonstrated that only the already
familiar pointer observables can leave a redundant and
robust imprint on E . Corollary V.3 can be understood as
a consequence of the ability of the pointer states to per-
sist while immersed in the environment. This resilience
allows the information about the pointer observables to
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proliferate, very much in the spirit of the Darwinian “sur-
vival of the fittest”. This, along with other facts, will be
illustrated on a dynamical model in the next section.
VI. QUANTUM DARWINISM: DYNAMICAL
EMERGENCE OF OBJECTIVITY
It should by now be clear that the presence of re-
dundant information in the environment imposes severe
physical constraints on the state of the system. Surpris-
ingly, the derivation of these important facts required
little physics — most of them followed from information-
theoretic arguments, once again illustrating that infor-
mation is physical. One could sum up our conclusions
by noting that the environment can be a perfect witness
— with multiple perfect records — but only for one set
of commuting observables defined by the perfect maxi-
mally refined pointer observables. Such perfection will
generally be only approximated in the real world. It
is therefore important to investigate the situation where
multiple, yet imperfect, copies arise through the dynam-
ics. To this end we shall consider selective proliferation
of information in a simple model that exhibits quantum
Darwinism.
By focusing on the dynamics of SE rather than on their
state we will be able to extend our analysis. In particular,
we will show that when the imprints of the objective ob-
servable are nearly perfect — i.e. IˆE(A) ≥ (1 − ϑ)H(A)
and Rδ(A) > 1 for ϑ ≪ 1 and δ ≪ 1 finite but small
— the conclusions obtained earlier still hold. Above all,
along the lines of Theorem V.1, there exists a unique
maximally refined observable whose information is the
only one available in fragments of E . Finally, we will be
able to specify the optimal measurement to be performed
on fragments of E to learn about the system. This is a
considerable improvement over the result of the last sec-
tion where, in the absence of any model Hamiltonian, we
could only demonstrate the existence of such a measure-
ment.
A. Dynamics of Quantum Darwinism and
decoherence
The model we consider is a generalization of the sim-
ple early model of decoherence put forward in [12] and
throughly investigated as a tractable, yet non-trivial,
paradigm for decoherence: despite its simplicity, it cap-
tures the essence of einselection. Hence, our simple model
serves as a special case that sets a conceptual framework
for the study of more sophisticated models, such as a
photon environment scattering on an object and carry-
ing away potential visual data. As any specific model, it
requires some fairly specific assumptions. We shall con-
sider their role in the next section and discuss the extent
to which relaxing some of these assumptions affects our
conclusions.
A system S is coupled to an environment E =
{E1, . . . , EN} through the Hamiltonian:
HSE =
∑
Ek∈E
A⊗ ZEk , (19)
where A and ZEk are operators acting on S and Ek re-
spectively. The joint initial state of the system and the
different environmental subsystems is assumed to be a
pure product state:
|ΦSE(0)〉 = |φS〉 ⊗ |φE1〉 ⊗ |φE2〉 ⊗ . . . . (20)
Hence, before the interaction, there is no correlation be-
tween the system and the environment, nor among the
environmental subsystems.
A convenient way of writing |φS〉 in view of expressing
the time evolution of the joint state of SE is to decompose
it in an eigenbasis |i〉 of A (A|i〉 = ai|i〉):
|φS〉 =
∑
i
αi|i〉. (21)
Without loss of generality, we can assume that the vec-
tors |i〉 with non-zero coefficients αi in Eq. (21) are as-
sociated with distinct eigenvalues ai of A. This can be
done by choosing appropriate bases for the degenerate
eigenspaces of A. Thus, after an interaction time t with
the N subsystems of the environment, the joint state of
SE evolves into:
|ΦSE(t)〉 =
∑
j
αj |j〉
⊗
Ek∈E
e−itajZ
Ek |φEk〉 (22)
=
∑
j
αj |j〉
⊗
Ek∈E
|φEkj 〉, (23)
where we have defined |φEkj 〉 = e−itajZ
Ek |φEk〉.
In the following sections, we will analyze the correla-
tions between the system S and the “observed” part of
the environment F . For example, in the case of a pho-
ton environment scattering on an object, F is the set of
photons that hit the observer’s retina, while F represents
those photons that have scattered on S but that are not
intercepted by the observer. Equation (23) allows us to
compute the state of S and F :
ρSF =
∑
ij
αiα
∗
j |i〉〈j| ⊗ |ΦFi 〉〈ΦFj | × γFij , (24)
where
|ΦFj 〉 =
⊗
Ek∈F
e−iajZ
Ek t|φEk〉 =
⊗
Ek∈F
|φEkj 〉 , (25)
and γFij =
∏
Ek∈F
〈φEkj |φEki 〉 = 〈ΦFj |ΦFi 〉. Similarly, the
reduced state of the system at time t reads:
ρS =
∑
ij
αiα
∗
j |i〉〈j| × γEij , (26)
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where γEij =
∏
Ek∈E
〈φEk |e−it(ai−aj)ZEk |φEk〉. Above, the
γ’s are called the decoherence factors.
Except in carefully controlled experiments — where
the system can be very well isolated from its environment
— the number of environmental subsystems interacting
with S is huge. In this case, the γEij ’s will be typically
very small for i 6= j. Each environmental subsystem con-
tributes a factor 〈φEk |e−i(ai−aj)ZEk t|φEk〉 to γEij , so un-
less |φEk〉 is an eigenstate of ZEk — in which case Ek
is effectively decoupled from the system — this strictly
decreases the decoherence factor. Hence, γEij goes to δij
as N increases. To be more specific, when the initial
states of the environmental subsystems are distributed
uniformly at random, the decrease of γEij is exponential
with N and typically Gaussian with time [33].
This reasoning also applies to the decoherence factors
γFij : they tend to zero for i 6= j as the number of unob-
served environmental subsystems increases. Even though
a considerable number of the environmental subsystems
can be intercepted by the observer, an even larger frac-
tion will usually escape his monitoring. Thus, the γFij ’s
will also typically be very small for i 6= j.
We have numerically studied a version of this model
(the case of two dimensional system and environmental
subsystems) in [20]. Our results indicate that for suf-
ficiently large environment, several system observables
can become nearly perfectly imprinted in the environ-
ment (see Fig. 1a of [20]). However, the results also
clearly show that only those observables very “close” to
the pointer observable can leave a redundant imprint in
the environment (see Fig. 1b of [20]). The information
about the other system observables can only be accessed
by measuring the entire environment: their value cannot
be learned from small fragments of E . In what follows,
we will derive these facts analytically.
B. Decoherence: the focus on the system
In order to contrast the environment as a witness ap-
proach to classicality as well as to illustrate significance
of the dynamics that leads to quantum Darwinism, we
will now review some results that were obtained using
more conventional approaches. Thus, we will abandon
for a moment the study of correlations between S and
parts of the environment to focus uniquely on the state
of the system, as it is done in the the standard studies of
decoherence [8, 9].
We see from Eq. (26) that the off-diagonal terms of the
system’s density matrix tend to be very small when ex-
pressed in the |i〉 basis. It is therefore natural to expect
that these are the quasi-classical states of the system:
the coupling to the environment suppresses quantum su-
perpositions of the states |i〉. Of course, the exact in-
stantaneous diagonal basis of ρS might differ from |i〉,
especially when the coefficients αj of the system’s initial
state Eq. (21) are almost equal. Hence, for someone fo-
cused on the instantaneous state of the system, it may
not be clear why the basis |i〉 deserves any special atten-
tion in spite of the existence of small — yet non-zero —
off-diagonal elements for ρS . However, a simple analysis
shows that the basis |i〉 is the only basis for which all off-
diagonal terms tend to zero independently of the initial
state of the system, and, thus, retain correlations with
the rest of the Universe. This ability to retain correla-
tions is behind the predictability of the pointer states —
it is in fact their defining feature (see [4, 12] for the initial
formulation, and [10, 11, 34] for a recent re-assessment).
Persistence of correlations implies continued existence
of the states [10, 18]. Independence of the pointer states
from the initial state of the system is obviously a very im-
portant property of the to-be-classical states: the quasi-
classical domain must be independent of the initial state
of the system — e.g., the set of the pointer states of the
apparatus should not depend on the state of the mea-
sured quantum system. When the system is initially pre-
pared in one of the states |i〉, it will not be affected by
the interaction with the environment: pointer states are
stable. In more general cases (more complicated inter-
actions, etc.), the above simple analysis cannot be car-
ried out, and one usually relies on the predictability sieve
[8, 9, 17, 24] to find the pointer basis. Predictability
sieve seeks most predictable initial states — states that
produce the smallest amount of entropy over time while
subject to interaction with the environment.
C. Perfect correlations
We now return to the study of the correlations between
S and fragments of the environment. Our goal is to char-
acterize what kind and how information is stored in the
environment when it is redundant. To be more precise,
we will analyze the structure of information in a fragment
F of E under the assumption that the rest of the envi-
ronment, i.e. F = E −F , contains at least one additional
copy of this information. Our demand that both F and
F contain a copy of the information ensures a minimum
redundancy of R ≥ 2 which — although insufficient to
ensure the emergence of a consensus about the proper-
ties of S among many observers — is enough to re-derive
directly most of the results established in Section V. 3
In addition, we will be able to specify optimal measure-
ment strategies on F , the fragment of E accessible to the
observer, for inferring any kind of information about S.
To build our intuition, it is enlightening to first con-
sider the limiting case γFij = γ
F
ij = δij , where γ
F
ij =
3 In this toy model, all the environmental subsystems couple to the
system in the same way, so only the size of the fragments F and F
matters. Thus, complications illustrated in Fig. 3 and analyzed
in Theorem V.2 do not occur, and redundancy R ≥ 2 is indeed
sufficient to establish uniqueness of the preferred observable.
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〈ΦFi |ΦFj 〉. We return to the general case in Section VID.
Following the general argument of Section VIA, perfect
correlation will be recovered when the environment is in-
finite. In our analysis, this condition reflects the physical
assumption that both the observed and the unobserved
fragments of E are very large. It is also possible to ob-
tain perfect correlations in much smaller systems when
the dynamics is fine-tuned so that the resulting state is
GHZ-like. In either case, the density matrix of S and F
reads
σSF =
∑
i
|αi|2|i〉〈i| ⊗ |ΨFi 〉〈ΨFi | (27)
where the |ΨFi 〉’s are mutually orthogonal. Note that ρ
and the |ΦFi 〉’s of Eqs. (24-25) have been replaced respec-
tively by ‘σ and |ΨFi 〉’s to emphasize γFij = δij .
Consider the observable X ∈ MF that perfectly dis-
tinguishes between the orthogonal states |ΨFi 〉:
X =
∑
i
xi|ΨFi 〉〈ΨFi | =
∑
i
xiXi. (28)
Following Eq. (5), the state of the system after a mea-
surement of X on F with outcome Xj is
σS|Xj = TrF{σSF|Xj} =
TrF{XjσSFXj}
p(Xj)
= |j〉〈j|. (29)
This is the same as the state of S after a direct measure-
ment of A with outcome Aj , σ
S
|Xj
= σS|Aj . Thus, a sub-
sequent measurement of A on the system yields outcome
Ai with certainty, so H(A|X) = 0. The same conclusion
can be reached for a measurement acting on F : thus, A is
encoded redundantly in E (there are at least two copies).
As a consequence, all the results of Section V trivially
hold (with exception of Theorem V.2). It is however in-
structive to derive them directly for our specific model,
without appealing to the general lemmas.
As seen from Eq. (29), the indirect measurement X
perfectly emulates the direct measurement A on the sys-
tem. Consequently, all the information about the ob-
servable A can be extracted by the measurement X on
the environment. In addition, we clearly see the “no-
information / no-disturbance” principle at work: once
the outcome of X is known, measuring A directly does
not disturb the state of the system any further, as the
measurement of X “projects” the system in an eigen-
state of A (see Corollary V.1). Averaging over the mea-
surement outcomes of X yields the reduced density ma-
trix of S, which is a mixture of the eigenstates of A, so
[ρS ,A] = 0 as specified by Lemma V.2.
Specifying the Hamiltonian responsible for the corre-
lations between S and its environment allows one to go
beyond the purely information-theoretic analysis of Sec-
tion V. Given the explicit form of the density matrix
σSF , we can address more interesting questions such as:
what is the optimal measurement Y on F that yields the
largest amount of information about a given system ob-
servable B? In fact, it turns out that X is the optimal
measurement on F to find out the value of any system
observable B. Regardless of what we wish to learn about
the system, the optimal strategy consists in measuringX
on F :
I(B : X) ≥ I(B : Y) (30)
for all B ∈ MS and Y ∈ MF . Similarly, when a non-
optimal measurement Y is carried on F , it is always pri-
marily correlated with the pointer observableA. In other
words, when a measurement Y is carried on a fragment
of the environment, it always reveals more information
about the pointer observable A than any other system
observable:
I(A : Y) ≥ I(B : Y) (31)
for all B ∈ MS and Y ∈ MF .
Let us prove these two very important assertions.
First, note that following Eqs. (8,10), the mutual infor-
mation between any system observable B and environ-
mental observable Y takes the following form:
I(B : Y) = H(B)−H(B|Y) (32)
= H(Y)−H(Y|B). (33)
When B is a fixed system observable, maximizing I(B :
Y) amounts to minimizing H(B|Y). To do this, consider
the conditional state σS|Yi of the system given a measure-
ment outcome Yi on F . Simple algebraic manipulations
can be used to show that
σS|Yi =
TrF{YiσSFYi}
p(Yi)
=
∑
j
p(Xj |Yi)σS|Xj . (34)
We see that σS|Yi is a convex combination of the σ
S
|Xj
.
(This is no coincidence: it follows from Corollary V.1,
V.3, and the existence of information aboutA, and hence
about X, in the rest of the environment F .) Hence, the
inequality of Eq. (30) follows from the convexity of en-
tropy, c.f. Proposition X.4. Similarly, when Y is a fixed
measurement on F , maximizing I(B : Y) amounts to
minimizing H(Y|B). We can consider the state of F
following a measurement of B on S
σF|Bi =
TrS{BiσSFbi}
p(Bi)
=
∑
j
p(Aj |Bi)σF|Aj , (35)
a convex combination of the states of F conditioned on a
measurement of A on S. Again, the inequality Eq. (31)
follows from convexity of entropy, c.f. Proposition X.4.
By combining Eq. (30) with the fact that measuring X
perfectly emulates the direct measurement A on S, we
get the following equality:
IˆF (B) = I(B : A). (36)
The information about B accessible from the fragment F
is inherently limited by its correlation with the maximally
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refined observable A. The only assumption required to
arrive at this important equality is that correlations with
both the observed and the unobserved parts of the en-
vironment impose γFij = γ
F
ij = δij . This requirement
is, according to Corollary V.2, equivalent to saying that
both F and F contain a perfect copy of the information
about A.
The consequences of Equation (36) can be better ap-
preciated once we recognize that it allows to evaluate the
redundancy for any system observable straightforwardly.
When the value of B can be deduced from knowledge
of the value of A, then each fragment of E containing
information about A will inevitably contain information
about B. Formally,
I(B : A) ≥ (1− δ)IˆE (B)⇒ Rδ(B) ≥ Rδ=0(A). (37)
On the other hand, when the value of B cannot be de-
duced from knowledge of A, B cannot be redundant:
I(B : A) < (1− δ)IˆE (B)⇒ Rδ(B) = 1. (38)
This is because Eq. (36) holds as long as F¯ contains infor-
mation about A. To have IˆF (B) ≥ IˆE(B), forces to take
F¯ small enough so that it does not contain much infor-
mation about A. By virtue of Eq. (30), F¯ also contains
little information about B, implying Rδ(B) = 1.
Note that these results can also be derived with the
help of the data processing inequality (see Proposi-
tion X.5). In effect, the update rule of Eq. (5) shows
that the sequence of measurements B, A, X, Y forms a
Markov chain (B and Y are arbitrary): the joint proba-
bility of the measurement results of B, A, X, Y satisfies
p(Yi, Xj, Ak, Bl) = p(Yi|Xj)p(Xj |Ak)p(Ak|Bl)p(Bl),
(39)
yielding Eqs. (30,31) directly. This alternative deriva-
tion provides a very clear interpretation of our previous
result. Trying to gather information about B (instead
of A) with the indirect measurement Y (instead of X)
can be viewed as the addition of noise over the perfect
communication channel that allows the transmission of
information about A in the environment.
Equations (37-38) extend Theorem V.1 to imperfect
redundant imprints (i.e. finite δ). Only observables
“close” to the maximally refined redundant observableA
— where closeness is measured with the help of mutual
information — can leave a redundant (even imperfect)
imprint in their environment. Moreover, it confirms the
behavior found in the numerical study presented in [20].
D. Imperfect correlations
The previous section analyzed the consequences of per-
fect correlations between S and F in terms of optimal
measurement strategies. However, perfect correlations
are rarely found in Nature. Even for our simple model,
perfect correlations can be assumed only in an asymp-
totic limit, as N tends toward infinity, or by a careful
tuning of the interaction time and strength. Hence, it
is important to understand what happens when the con-
ditions are not perfect. Here, we show that nearly per-
fect correlations — γF and γF sufficiently small — are
enough to ensure the validity of the results established
above, up to small correction terms.
The technique we use is inspired by perturbation the-
ory. It relies on the construction of a “perfectly corre-
lated” state σSF of the form Eq. (27) which is “close”
to the actual state ρSF of Eq. (24) generated by the dy-
namics. Then, using various bounds on entropies, we will
conclude that all the information-theoretic quantities ex-
tracted from the ideal σSF are approximately equal to
those extracted from the actual ρSF . We will also exam-
ine the regime of validity of this approximation.
Let us define
σSF =
∑
i
|αi|2|i〉〈i| ⊗ |ΨFi 〉〈ΨFi |, (40)
where the |ΨFi 〉’s are obtained by applying the Gram-
Schmidt orthonormalisation procedure to the states
|ΦFi 〉’s (see the appendix for the details of this construc-
tion). With this definition, we will show that for any
two observables B and Y, when γF = maxij |γFij | and
γF = maxij |γFij | are small,
Iρ(B : Y) ≈ Iσ(B : Y). (41)
Above, the subscripts ρ and σ refer to the state, either
the actual ρSF or the perfect σSF , used to derive the
probabilities of the measurement outcomes, that in turn
are used to quantify information (this shorthand nota-
tion will be used in the rest of this section). Therefore,
when Eq. (41) holds, all the conclusions derived from the
perfect correlation case remain approximately true.
Equation (41) is a consequence of simple inequalities
that give an upper bound on the difference |Iρ(B : Y)−
Iσ(B,Y)|. First, Cauchy-Schwartz inequality (Proposi-
tion X.1) gives Tr |ρSF − σSF | ≤
√
dS‖ρSF − σSF‖2.
Second, by definition of the trace distance between
two density matrices (Definition X.1),
∑
ij |pρ(Bi, Yj) −
pσ(Bi, Yj)| ≤ Tr |ρSF−σSF |. Finally, by combining these
results with Lemma X.1 and Fanne’s inequality (Proposi-
tion X.3) applied separately to each of the three entropies
involved in I(B,Y) = H(B)+H(Y)−H(B,Y), we find
|Iρ(B : Y)− Iσ(B : Y)| (42)
≤ −3f(γF , γF) log(f(γF , γF)/dS)
+O((γF )3/4 + γF ),
with f(γF , γF) =
√
dS{2(dS − 1)(γF)2 + (γF)2}. Thus,
this difference tends to zero when γF and γF tend to
zero.
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To gain further insight into the regime of validity of
Eq. (41), recall that γF and γF typically decrease expo-
nentially with the number of environmental subsystems
that have effectively interacted with S. Therefore, for
equation Eq. (41) to hold within constant accuracy, it is
sufficient that each fragment F and F contains a number
of subsystems Ek scaling as log dS (or as a polynomial in
log dS). As discussed at the end of Section III, dS is the
effective dimension of the probed degree of freedom of S,
i.e. the number of distinguishable outcomes of an hypo-
thetical measurementB. Clearly then, log dS is generally
much smaller than the size of the environment. There-
fore, the conclusions drawn from the perfect correlation
study remain essentially unchanged: A is the observ-
able of the system that leaves the strongest imprint in
fragments of the environment; the optimal environmen-
tal measurement to learn about any system observable
is the one that reveals information about A; and finally
failing to interrogate F about A has the same effect as
introducing noise in the measurement results. These con-
clusions hold to within an accuracy of roughly log dS/N ,
which is enough in most situations involving macroscopic
systems.
VII. DISCUSSION: OPEN QUESTIONS AND
CONNECTIONS
Environment as a witness as well as quantum Darwin-
ism — the dynamics responsible for the redundant im-
printing of certain states that leads to their objectivity
— are based on the same dynamical paradigm that is
used in the study of decoherence and einselection. The
to-be-classical “object of interest” (the system S or the
apparatus A) is immersed in the environment. What is
now different — and this is a dramatic departure from
the usual view of what matters — is the focus. Instead
of analyzing either the state of S per se, or even the fate
of the correlations between S and A, attention shifts to
the information available to the observer in fragments of
E .
This shift of focus has been precipitated by the real-
ization [17, 18, 19] that observers only rarely (if ever)
acquire information by direct interaction with “systems
of interest”: rather, we use E as a communication chan-
nel. The message — the state of the object of interest —
is imprinted on E in multiple copies. However, the no-
cloning theorem implies that arbitrary unknown states
cannot be “advertised” throughout the environment in
this fashion. Hence, as one can expect (and as our anal-
ysis indeed shows), selection of a preferred observable is
a prerequisite for this redundant imprinting.
The basic intuition — the implication of the
information-theoretic redundancy of the record for the
emergence of the classical — was noted already some
time ago [12, 19, 29]. It was refined into a more pre-
cise measure of redundancy — into Rδ we employed here
— only recently [20]. Using this δ-redundancy we have
demonstrated — either under very specific assumptions
of [20], or in a still rather specific, but somewhat more
general setting of this paper — that the familiar pointer
observables are easiest to find indirectly, from the records
imprinted on the fragments of the environment.
The aim of this section is to examine assumptions that
went into our discussion and, by doing so, to explore the
range of validity of our conclusions. The results obtained
in Section V did not require any assumption about the
physical model, but only apply to the case of perfect
correlations. Thus, the model studied in Section VI is a
convenient focus of attention. To establish uniqueness of
a set of commuting preferred observables that is easiest
to infer from E we have assumed that:
1. The initial state is a pure product state.
2. The system has no self-Hamiltonian.
3. Every environmental subsystem couples to the
same system observable.
4. The environment has no Hamiltonian.
To find out which of these assumptions can be relaxed,
and the extent to which they are responsible for the con-
clusions we have reached will eventually require investiga-
tion of other, more realistic, or at least “differently over-
simplified” models. For “standard” decoherence, a sim-
ilarly idealized model was put forward over two decades
ago, but the investigation of various related and unre-
lated models of decoherence and einselection is still an
ongoing activity, often yielding new insights. The same
can be expected of quantum Darwinism. Different mod-
els may also require different mathematical tools. One
such investigation — using von Neumann entropy and
the symmetric Equation (10) for mutual information —
is currently under way [25] and points toward compatible
conclusions.4 All we can offer here is a brief (and possi-
bly premature) discussion of the role and importance of
various assumptions, including these listed above.
Assumption 1 is probably the most unrealistic: in
practice composite environments are rarely in a pure
product state. Luckily, perfect purity per se is not essen-
tial to rely on the environment as a trustworthy witness.
Having enough information about E will, however — and
4 The two formulae for the mutual information, Eqs. (8) and (10),
cease to coincide when the von Neumann entropy of the two sub-
systems and the relevant joint and conditional entropies are used
on their left hand sides. The difference between the symmetric
and asymmetric mutual information is the discord [10, 19, 35].
Discord is a measure of the quantumness of the correlation. It can
be used to show that even separable correlated states of two sys-
tems need not be classical. Discord is suppressed by decoherence.
So, when a small fraction of the environment is interrogated by
the observer, its correlations with S tend to be effectively clas-
sical. It follows that — in that case – estimates of redundancy
based on either the mutual information defined by Equation (8)
or by Eq. (10) are essentially identical.
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in contrast to decoherence and einselection — prove to
be indispensable.
Indeed, it is often convenient to study decoherence as-
suming a very mixed state of the environment (i.e., ther-
mal equilibrium or even a perfect mixture) when deriving
master equations used to implement predictability sieve.
Consequences of different initial mixtures of E are, gen-
erally, somewhat different time dependences, and minor
changes in the structure of the master equation (which
often becomes less Markovian and less tractable when the
environment is further away from a convincing thermal
state), but the key qualitative conclusions that character-
ize decoherence and einselection — the localized nature
of the preferred states and the fact that relaxation can
be much slower than decoherence — seem to be usually
unaffected.
By contrast, the degree of ignorance about the frag-
ments of the environment plays an essential role in the
study of the environment as a witness. The reader may
be surprised by this. After all, the results of Section V
and VI were derived by an information-theoretic analysis
of a rather general scenario, so — given the assumptions
— conclusions should be independent of the initial state
of E . In particular, redundancy — when present — re-
mains a highly selective criterion. However, and this is
the crux of the matter, the starting point of our investi-
gation — the assumption that fragments of the environ-
ment contain information about the system — depends
strongly on the initial state of E .
When the environment is initially mixed, it will “know
less” about the system. The change of the state of the
environment after it has interacted with the system pro-
vides the evidence about the state of S. But when ei-
ther all of E or some subsystems of it are totally mixed,
they cannot be altered by the conditional dynamics that
causes decoherence. And even partial mixing will make it
more difficult for the environment to serve as a wittness.
To see why, let the initial state of the environment be an
arbitrary non-entangled state:
ρE =
∑
ℓ
pℓ
⊗
Ek
|φℓEk〉〈φℓEk |. (43)
In particular, it could be a product of mixed states
ρE = ρE1 ⊗ ρE2 ⊗ . . . ρEN , such as the thermal state of
non-interacting environmental subsystems. By linearity
of the Schro¨dinger equation, the joint state of S and a
fragment F of E after an interaction time t will be
ρSF =
∑
ℓ
pℓ
∑
ij
αiα
∗
j |i〉〈j|
⊗
Ek
|φℓEki 〉〈φℓEkj | × γℓFij (44)
where |φℓEki 〉 and γℓFij are defined as in Section VIA.
In the previous sections, we have studied the kinds
of correlations that arise given any of the components⊗
Ek
|φℓEk〉 of this mixture. It follows from the convexity
of entropy (c.f. Proposition X.4) that the information
contained in this mixture will be strictly less than the
average information contained in the individual compo-
nents of the mixture. As we have noted above, mixing
the state of the environmental subsystems decreases their
information storage capacity; when the state of the envi-
ronment is perfectly mixed, it will simply be impossible
to learn anything from it. Yet, the usual decoherence still
leads to einselection — there will still be a pointer basis
(defined e.g. through the predictability sieve).
When the initial state of E is not completely mixed,
it is usually possible to extract from it some information
about the system. In fact, given the assumption of redun-
dancy, the qualitative conclusions of the previous section
will still hold: the information about any system observ-
able available in fragments of E is intrinsically limited
by the information about it obtained through a direct
measurement of the maximally refined redundantly im-
printed observable A; Eq. (36) becomes the inequality
IˆF (B) ≤ I(B : A). Therefore, we again anticipate the
conclusion that only observables “close” to A can get
redundantly imprinted in E .
Mixed initial states of E will decrease channel capacity
of the environment. Moreover, modes of the environ-
ment that can be imprinted with information about dif-
ferent aspects of S will be in general mixed to a different
degree. This may be reflected in the selective coarse-
graining with which the observer perceives the system.
This raises an interesting possibility: observables that
are selected by the predictability sieve need not coincide
with the (typically coarse - grained) observables that are
easiest to find out about from E . For example, this may
happen when the modes that dominate decoherence (and
hence einselection) are so mixed that they cannot serve
as a useful communication channel, and the only modes
that are sufficiently pure to be useful for this purpose
monitor some other observable. An observer will then
find out about that other coarse-grained observable, but
with the resolution limited by indeterminacy: after all,
pointer observable is still einselected by the environmen-
tal monitoring! Presence or absence of this effect is re-
lated to the assumption of the “typical environment frag-
ment” we have noted in [20]. In other words, when the
fragments of E that the observer can use to extract in-
formation about S contain or reveal data in a selective
manner, environment acts as a witness with a selective
memory (or a partial amnesia). Exactly how mixed can
E be to be still useful as a witness is of course the key
question. We leave it as a subject for further research.
When the initial state of the system is mixed, but the
environment is sufficiently pure and large so that sig-
nificant redundant imprinting can arise from their inter-
action, environment can become a useful and trustwor-
thy witness, and our approach should go through essen-
tially unimpeded. Similarly, preexisting correlation with
E need not undermine our conclusions. In effect, it will
typically mean that the environment was gathering evi-
dence about the system in the past (although one can cer-
tainly imagine pathological preexisting correlations that
get undone by the subsequent interaction).
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To sum up, while the assumption of the initial product
state has simplified our analysis, it can be relaxed to some
extent without undermining our basic conclusions. What
is non-negotiable is the demand that the final state allows
one to discern evidence about S in the fragments of E .
One can already anticipate that this demand will also put
a constraint on the entanglement between the fragments
of E , as we shall note in the discussion of the assumption
4 below.
Assumption 2 precludes non-trivial evolution of the
system. Relaxing it has been studied in the context of
decoherence and einselection, and — as we have done
above — we shall gain insight into its role in quantum
Darwinism by recounting the implications of evolution
for einselection, and analyzing their significance for the
role of the environment as a witness.
In the studies of einselection the relative strength of
the self-HamiltonianHS and the interaction Hamiltonian
HSE is an important ingredient that decides the course
and effect of einselection. When the self-Hamiltonian
is negligible or when HS and HSE commute, the envi-
ronment monitors static states of the system — pointer
states selected solely by the interaction [4, 12]. In a sense,
environment contains a record of a very uneventful his-
tory — things stay the same forever.
When the effect of HS is no longer negligible, these
histories become more interesting. One may enter, for
example, the “partial Zeno effect” regime where the evo-
lution of the state of the system induced by the self-
Hamiltonian is impeded (but not completely suppressed)
by the environmental monitoring mediated by HSE (see,
e.g., [8]). Models of such situations have been analyzed
using rather different approach of quantum trajectories
[36] that shares with quantum Darwinism the focus on
the information gained indirectly from E . There the en-
vironment is usually assumed to consist of photons, and
the system is often a two-level “atom”. Pointer states
still emerge and turn out to be the easiest states to infer
from a fraction of such E [37]. The basis ambiguity may
reappear only if the whole E could be captured. This
ability to rely on a fraction of E allows for the possibility
of consensus between multiple observers [38].
As the coupling to the environment becomes weak the
problem may become more tractable again, especially in
two rather different limits. When the environment is
slow, with the high-frequency cutoff that is small com-
pared to the level spacing of the spectrum of HS , einse-
lection enters its quantum limit [39]. Energy eigenstates
are imprinted on the environment more or less regard-
less of the specific form of the coupling. Histories are
again becoming rather uneventful, although for reasons
quite different from these we have mentioned above in
the negligible HS case.
By contrast, when the environment is “broadband”,
with all the frequencies from very low to very high
present, and the system is (at least approximately) lin-
ear and coupled to E through its position, coherent states
are the most predictable, and hence, pointer. Weak cou-
pling does not preclude redundancy of the records. In
this underdamped limit one can recover approximately
reversible Liouvillian dynamics with localized states (i.e.,
approximately reversible classical trajectories that follow
Newton’s laws emerge; see [9, 10], and references therein).
When the system is linear (e.g., harmonic oscillator) pre-
ferred pointer states turn out to be Gaussian [17, 24], and
one may anticipate that sequences of the most redundant
“environmental records” will correlate with classical tra-
jectories.
The quick summary of different possibilities above is
meant to be suggestive rather than exhaustive, and is
definitely not conclusive. What one would like to recover
using environment as a witness is the notion of objec-
tive histories defined through sequences of time-ordered
redundant records. Such objective histories could con-
sist of sequences of approximate instantaneous pointer
states. They were conjectured to exist in the limit of
very efficient and frequent broad-band monitoring by the
environment in [10]. Histories deduced from redundant
records would be objective, and may be only approxi-
mate. It will be interesting to investigate their relation
to consistent histories [40, 41, 42, 43, 44], especially when
consistency is assured through the “strong decoherence”
condition introduced in [30] (see also [31]) that invokes
existence of a perfect environmental record.
Assumption 3 assures that there is a preferred ob-
servable of S that is recorded by E , and that it is sin-
gled out by the interaction Hamiltonian. This is a strong
assumption, but often a reasonably realistic one: typi-
cal couplings between the systems (and, hence, between
S and E) tend to depend on the distance (i.e., relative
position) between them. As a consequence — as was al-
ready pointed out in the context of einselection [7, 12] —
pointer states tend to be localized in position.
One can of course imagine situations where this is not
the case. For instance, there may be several physically
distinct environments, each attempting to monitor a dif-
ferent observable of S. One would expect that a domi-
nant coupling would then impose its selection of the pre-
ferred observable, and the effect of the others would be
perceived as noise.
This last remark leads to interesting questions about
the correspondence between the approximate pointer ob-
servable that is selected by the predictability sieve as a
result of the interaction of S with E , and the states of the
system that are easiest to infer for an observer who has
access to a single subsystem of the environment. Clearly,
in full generality this case is not covered by our idealized
assumptions earlier in the paper. For example, Gaus-
sian pointer states are often selected by the predictability
sieve, and yet they are not orthogonal and form an over-
complete basis, so some of the steps we have used in our
proofs may not go through. Nevertheless, one may ex-
pect that — as was the case with decoherence — results
that are exact for perfect pointer states (that are left un-
touched by decoherence) are still approximately valid for
approximate pointer states (that are least touched by de-
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coherence). Thus, even when the environment fragments
that are the most useful channel to the observer inter-
ested in E are not a typical sample of the environments
responsible for decoherence, one may still guess that the
states of S that can be inferred from them will represent
an appropriately coarse-grained versions of the pointer
states. Given the role Gaussian states play in the dis-
cussion of various models of decoherence, the extent to
which Gaussian states coincide with the states that are
easiest to infer is of obvious interest, and a likely area of
future studies, but beyond the scope of this paper (see
however [45]). Along the same line of thought, when the
environment fragments that are the most useful to the
observer interested in S are not a typical sample of the
environments responsible for decoherence, one may still
guess that the states of S that can be inferred from them
will represent an appropriately coarse-grained versions of
the pointer states.
Given the role Gaussians play in discussion of various
models of decoherence, the extent to which Gaussians
that are most predictable coincide with the states that
are easiest to infer is of obvious interest, and a likely area
of future studies, but beyond the scope of this paper.
Assumption 4 assures that the environment does not
evolve (and, therefore, does not complicate or even oblit-
erate the record it has made of S). More careful study
of the consequences of relaxing this assumption can be
found elsewhere [46]. Here we offer only a brief discussion
of the basic possibilities.
One can distinguish three components of this require-
ment: fragments of the environment could evolve sepa-
rately, they could interact with each other, or could in-
teract with more distant “second order” environments.
Let us first note that — in models where pointer ob-
servable commutes with the system-environment interac-
tion Hamiltonian (e.g. HSE =
∑
Ek∈E
A⊗ZEk , Eq. (19))
self-Hamiltonians of the individual fragments of E obvi-
ously cannot change the fact that [HSE ,A] = 0, so the
selection of the pointer basis is not affected by the dy-
namics of the environment. However, even in this simple
case the presence of such self-Hamiltonians can influence
the rate of acquisition of information by E and, hence, re-
dundancy [46]. We also note that in more realistic cases
when the system has a self-Hamiltonian that does not
commute with HSE the pointer observable is approxi-
mate, and even its choice can be influenced by how the
rate of information acquisition by E compares with the
dynamical timescales in S.
The interaction between the subsystems of E may be
a significant complication. It will typically lead to en-
tanglement between the fragments of E , and could make
their individual states mixed. Thus, — as we have al-
ready pointed out in discussion of assumption 1 — even
though the environment as a whole may still contain re-
dundant imprint of the state of the system, the relevant
global observables could become effectively inaccessible
to the observers who can sample E only through local
measurements on its fragments.
Last but not least, E could be immersed in its own
environment E ′. Effect of this second-order environment
will depend on the nature of their interaction. It could of
course erase the records of S in E , but it is also conceiv-
able that E ′ could monitor the record-keeping observables
of the fragments of E , which would increase the redun-
dancy [10].
These are very interesting complications, very much
worthy of further study. We note, however, that human
observers tend to rely on photons for the vast majority
of data about “systems of interest”. And photons, in
effect, satisfy our assumption 4. This seems to us to be
no accident.
It is clear from the above discussion that quantum Dar-
winism requires stronger assumptions than decoherence.
This is not surprising: it is easier to use any system (in-
cluding the environment) as a disposal, to get rid of un-
wanted information, than as a communication channel.
Furthermore, existence of the pointer states is a neces-
sary but not a sufficient condition for their redundant
imprinting on E . Nevertheless, even though quantum
Darwinism relies on stronger assumptions than einselec-
tion implemented e.g. through the predictability sieve, it
is also clear from our discussion that these more restric-
tive assumptions are met in the real world often enough
to employ environment as a reliable witness.
VIII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Observers use environment as a witness. This has ob-
vious and profound implications for the interpretation of
quantum theory. Nevertheless, it is not our intent here
to go beyond the comments we have made throughout
and to delve into a more extensive discussion of the im-
plications of quantum Darwinism for the interpretation
of quantum theory. In part, this is because some of the
interpretational issues have been noted elsewhere, on the
occasion of discussions of the role of redundancy in the
existential interpretation (see [10, 17, 18, 21], and ref-
erences therein). The basic idea — that the classical
domain can arise from within a quantum Universe, and
that it consists of states that can be found out without
being destroyed, and, hence, in that operational sense
exist independently of the observer — is obviously very
much assisted by employing environment as a witness.
Quantum Darwinism uses the same model of the in-
formation transfer that was introduced to study deco-
herence and einselection, but asks a different question:
instead of focusing — as does decoherence — on how
the information is lost from the system, it analyzes how
the information is gained and stored in the environment.
In decoherence, the role of the environment is limited to
hiding the underlying quantumness (view especially em-
phasized in discussions of quantum computation). Eins-
election recognizes that this information loss is selective,
and, thus, that the environment has a capacity to single
out preferred pointer states that are best at surviving im-
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mersion in E . Moreover, they are chosen in the process
reminiscent of a measurement — E acts as an apparatus
that (pre-)measures the pointer observable of the system
of interest.
This much was known. In particular, the monitoring
role of E was recognized early on [4]. Quantum Dar-
winism answers to the next logical question: since the
environment interacts with the to-be-classical observable
of the system of interest as would an apparatus, can it
be used as an apparatus? To address it we have had to
develop a measure of the objectivity of the records de-
posited in the environment. Redundancy (briefly consid-
ered [29], see also [12] in a similar context as a measure of
amplification) was refined [20] and used to prove that —
given reasonable assumptions — there is a unique set of
commuting observables that are easiest to find out from
fragments of E , and that these redundantly recorded ob-
servables are indeed the familiar pointer observables.
As a consequence, observers monitoring fragments of
the environment will be able to reach compatible conclu-
sions about the value of redundantly imprinted observ-
ables of the system, i.e. about the objective properties of
the system. In this operational sense, quantum Darwin-
ism provides a satisfying explanation for the emergence
of the objective classical world we perceive from the un-
derlying quantum substrate.
We have illustrated quantum Darwinism on a dynam-
ical model that is easy to analyze from an information-
theoretic perspective, and yet is inspired by a photon en-
vironment scattering on an object: all the environmental
subsystems couple to the object with the same Hamilto-
nian and do not interact with each other. This model
enabled us to push our analysis further, as we could ex-
plicitly determine the optimal environmental measure-
ments to learn about the properties of the system. It also
demonstrated that quantum Darwinism tolerates reason-
able departures from the “ideal” assumptions used to de-
rive our main results in Section V. In this respect, it cor-
roborates recent studies [10, 20] and earlier conjectures
[19, 29] that noted the role of redundancy in assuring
resilience of certain states — an essential feature of the
classical domain. Hence, redundancy is a robust and se-
lective criterion for determining objective properties of
open quantum systems.
While redundantly imprinted observables are dynam-
ically stable — as defined by einselection — the re-
verse is not necessarily true: quantum Darwinism re-
quires stronger assumptions, especially regarding struc-
ture, size, and the initial state of E . For example, a
single photon can be enough to decohere an object in su-
perposition of two distinct positions. However, it takes
a macroscopic number of them to redundantly broadcast
the position of this object throughout the environment.
While the entropy production of the system — a sig-
nature of decoherence — rapidly saturates, redundancy
can then continue to grow with time. This illustrates
how the increase of the redundancy of the record in the
environment captures the fact that the system is still
continuously “under observation”, and that information
about the pointer observable is getting amplified up to
the macroscopic level. In this sense, quantum Darwinism
can be motivated using Bohr’s original ideas [2] about the
role of amplification in the transition from quantum to
classical.
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X. APPENDIX
Definition X.1 (Trace distance) The trace distance
between two density operators ρ, σ is defined by D(ρ, σ) =
Tr |ρ− σ|. When ρ and σ commute, the trace distance is
equal to the L1-distance between the classical probability
distributions defined by their eigenvalues. Alternatively,
the trace distance is equal to 2maxP TrP (ρ − σ) where
the maximum is taken over positive operators P ≤ I
Definition X.2 (Euclidean distance) The Euclidean
distance between a pair of density operators ρ, σ is de-
fined by ‖ρ− σ‖2 =
√
Tr {(ρ− σ)2}.
Proposition X.1 (Cauchy-Schwartz inequality)
D(ρ, σ) ≤ √d‖ρ− σ‖2.
Proposition X.2 Let pi = Tr{Aiρ} and qi = Tr{Aiσ}
be the probabilities of the outcomes of a measurement
{Ai} for states ρ and σ respectively. Then, D(p, q) ≤
D(ρ, σ).
Proposition X.3 (Fanne’s inequality) Let pi and qi
with i = 1, 2, . . . , d be two classical probability distribu-
tions such that D(p, q) ≤ 1/e. Then |H(p) − H(q)| ≤
D(p, q) log d+ η(D(p, q)), with η(x) = −x log x.
Proposition X.4 (Convexity of entropy) Let
P (Xi|Yj) be a set of conditional probability distribution
for the random variable X, and P (Yj) be the probability
distribution for the random variable Y . Then
∑
j
[
P (Yj)
(
−
∑
i
P (Xi|Yj) lnP (Xi|Yj)
)]
≤ −
∑
i
P (Xi) lnP (Xi) (45)
where P (Xi) =
∑
j P (Xi|Yj)P (Yj).
Proposition X.5 (Data processing inequality)
Suppose X → Y → Z is a Markov chain, then
H(X) ≥ I(X : Y ) ≥ I(X : Z).
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Lemma X.1 For any matrix ρ =
∑
ij αiα
∗
j |i〉〈j| ⊗
|ΦFi 〉〈ΦFj |γFij , with αi 6= 0, and such that,
1. 〈i|j〉 = δij
2. |ΦFi 〉 are linearly independent;
3. |γFij | ≤ γF for i 6= j, and γFii = 1 for all i;
4. |〈ΦFi |ΦFj 〉| = |γFij | ≤ γF for i 6= j;
there exist a matrix σ =
∑
i |αi|2|i〉〈i| ⊗ |ΨFi 〉〈ΨFi |, satis-
fying
1. 〈ΨFi |ΨFj 〉 = δij ;
2. ‖ρ − σ‖2 ≤
√
2(dS − 1)γF + γF + O((γF )3/2 +
(γF)2).
where dS is the number of coefficients αi.
Proof The proof of this lemma relies on a careful anal-
ysis of Gram-Schmidt orthonormalisation procedure ap-
plied to the states |ΦFi 〉.
We define the new set of orthogonal states |ΨFi 〉 by the
following equations:
|ΨFi 〉 =
1
Ni

|ΦFi 〉 −∑
j<i
〈ΨFj |ΦFi 〉|ΨFj 〉

 , (46)
where Ni is a normalization factor.
More precisely, we prove by induction on i that the
following properties hold:
∣∣〈ΦFj |ΨFi 〉∣∣


≤ 2γF +O((γF )2), j < i
≥ 1− i−12 (γF)2 +O((γF )3), j = i≤ γF +O((γF )2), j > i
(47)
• i = 1. Trivial, since |ΨF1 〉 = |ΦF1 〉.
• i > 1. Now, we assume that the Eq. (47) holds for
k < i. By definition of Ni we have,
N2i = 1−
∑
k<i
∣∣〈ΦFi |ΨFk 〉∣∣2 (48)
≥ 1− (i− 1)(γF)2 +O((γF )3). (49)
Moreover, with Eq. (46) we also have,
∣∣〈ΦFj |ΨFi 〉∣∣ = 1Ni
∣∣∣∣∣〈ΦFj |ΦFi 〉 −
∑
k<i
〈ΨFk |ΦFi 〉〈ΦFj |ΨFk 〉
∣∣∣∣∣ .
1. When j < i we get
∣∣〈ΦFj |ΨFi 〉∣∣ ≤ 1Ni
(∣∣〈ΦFj |ΦFi 〉∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
k<i, k 6=j
〈ΨFk |ΦFi 〉〈ΦFj |ΨFk 〉
∣∣∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣〈ΨFj |ΦFi 〉〈ΦFj |ΨFj 〉∣∣
)
(50)
≤ 2γF +O((γF )2). (51)
2. For i = j,
∣∣〈ΦFi |ΨFi 〉∣∣ = Ni (52)
≥ 1− i− 1
2
(γF )2 +O((γF )3). (53)
3. Finally, in the case j > i, the contribution at
order γF comes from 〈ΦFj |ΦFi 〉 which gives,∣∣〈ΦFj |ΨFi 〉∣∣ ≤ γF +O((γF )2). (54)
With this result, we can easily calculate an upper
bound on ‖ρ− σ‖2:
Tr (ρ− σ)2 = Tr ρ2 +Tr σ2 − 2Tr ρσ (55)
= 2
∑
i
|αi|4(1− |〈ΦFi |ΨFi 〉|2)
+
∑
i6=j
|αi|2|αj |2|γFij |2
≤ 2(dS − 1)(γF)2 + (γF )2 +O((γF )3)
Therefore we have ‖ρ − σ‖2 ≤√
2(dS − 1)(γF )2 + (γF)2 + O((γF )3/2), concluding
the proof.
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